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Abstract
Before executing an attack, adversaries usually explore the victim’s network
in an attempt to infer the network topology and identify vulnerabilities in the
victim’s servers and personal computers. Falsifying the information collected
by the adversary post penetration may significantly slower lateral movement
and increase the amount of noise generated within the victim’s network. We
investigate the effect of fake vulnerabilities within a real enterprise network
on the attacker performance. We use the attack graphs to model the path
of an attacker making its way towards a target in a given network. We use
combinatorial optimization in order to find the optimal assignments of fake
vulnerabilities. We demonstrate the feasibility of our deception-based defense by
presenting results of experiments with a large scale real network. We show that
adding fake vulnerabilities forces the adversary to invest a significant amount
of effort, in terms of time and exploitability cost.
Keywords: attack graphs, moving target defense, heuristic search, attack cost
maximization
1. Introduction
Protecting a network is always a difficult task because attackers constantly
explore new ways to penetrate security systems by exploiting their vulnerabil-
ities. These vulnerabilities often go unpatched, due to lack of resources, negli-
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gence, or a variety of other reasons.
Although network professionals have offered various versions of the attack pro-
cess over the years, today the general anatomy of the attack process is thought
to be comprised of five steps [1]:
1. Reconnaissance
2. Scanning
3. Gaining access
4. Maintaining access
5. Covering tracks
Some networking professionals estimate that an adversary routinely spends up
to 95% of its time planning an attack, while only spending the remaining 5% on
execution [2]. During the reconnaissance step, the attacker attempts to gather as
much information about the designated network as possible, including network
topology, operating systems and applications, and unpatched vulnerabilities.
While doing so, the adversary generates traffic on the network, making itself
more vulnerable for detection[3].
In this research, we try to sabotage the reconnaissance and scanning steps of the
attack process by obfuscating the information acquired by the adversary. While
making the attacker repeat steps 1 and 2 repeatedly, after failing to achieve step
3.
It is well known, that attackers rely upon the ability to accurately identify
the operating system and services running on the network in order to plan and
execute successful attacks [1].
The desire to mislead a possible attacker underlies this research aiming to ex-
plore the possibilities of obfuscating the information acquired by an adversary.
This has been achieved by adding fake vulnerabilities that distract the attacker
and contribute to the erroneous construction of an attack path. Misleading the
attacker with false information can set the attacker on a path that will deplete
its resources, increase the likelihood of detection due to the increased activity,
and keep the attacker away from essential targets. We hypothesize that adding
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fake vulnerabilities will cause the attackers to perform additional activities while
attempting to achieve their goals.
In this study we assume that the attacker will choose the path with the lowest
total cost of the resulting attack graph. In addition, the attack graph is con-
structed from the information known to the adversary. Furthermore, we assume
that the attacker knows the structure of the given network, and the vulnerabil-
ities in each host.
In this research, we make the following contributions:
• We present a new defense strategy for protecting enterprise networks. This
method utilizes attack graphs for modeling all possible attack plans in a
given network. Fake vulnerabilities are then added to hosts in the network
in order to make it harder for an adversary to reach its goal in the target
network.
• In contrast to other studies that use small synthetic networks, this study
examines the impact of our algorithm on a real enterprise network, and
demonstrate the solution of the above challenge for a real organization.
• We gathered a collection of guidelines for fake vulnerabilities placement.
This study considered the fact that when a layer of deception is added to
a host in a network, it inhibits the network’s routine activity. Therefore,
the user, i.e., the enterprise aiming to protect its network, should decide
about the desired level of security it wishes to apply and the resources it
can and will provide for the task of protecting its network.
Another consideration pertains to the fake information provided to attack-
ers. If the fake information is naive or poorly chosen, the attacker may
immediately become suspicious and assume that the responses obtained
are deceptive [4]. In our research, we add the deceptive information care-
fully and sensibly, in such a way that it cannot be easily detected by an
attacker. While applying deceptive information to a specific host, we as-
sure that it is consistent with the environment and with other information
that can be concluded.
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Further more, we provide an efficient and effective algorithm for assign-
ment of fake vulnerabilities in the network.
• We formulate our problem as an AI challenge. We are looking for a group
of assignments which maximizes the adversary’s attack total cost, while it
tries to find the path with minimal cost. Actually, the attacker is trying
to solve a planning (AI) problem while our method searches for a hard
instance of this planning problem. In a general saying, we formulate a
search problem whose goal is to find a hard instance for an AI algorithm.
• We present an admissible but still feasible heuristic solution for the defined
problem. The admissibility property assures the optimal solution to our
problem.
2. Background on attack graphs
Attack graphs are data structures used to model the possible paths an at-
tacker could use to achieve its goal within a specific target network. The earliest
attack graphs [5, 6] were constructed manually by Red Teams and could not
scale to large networks. Later, technological advancement and the introduction
of logical attack graphs [7] made attack graph generation more scalable and
comprehensible to the human user. In general, attack graph generation requires
the complete network connectivity map and the list of existing vulnerabilities
in the network hosts [8].
The task of collecting the necessary data about the vulnerabilities and the
network structure must be automated. The former can be collected using either
one of the existing vulnerability scanners, for example Nessus [9] or openVAS
[10]. Various tools, such as NMAP [11], can aid in the network topology assess-
ment. However, accurate assessment of connectivity within large organizations
is still an open problem due to firewall rules, intrusion detection systems (IDS),
lack of documented switch and router configurations, etc.
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2.1. Attacker model
In this study we assume that the adversary’s goal is to obtain designated
privileges in the victim’s network, while minimizing attack cost. The adversary
also tries to minimize its footprint in the attacked network and to avoid re-
dundant / superfluous actions that create additional noise. The more noise the
adversary generates, the higher are the chances that the malicious activity will
be detected by an IDS. Reducing the consumption of resources is an objective
shared by both defenders and attackers alike.
This led us to conclude that the best approach for modeling the attacker
would follow the following assumptions:
• The attacker considers, on every step, the resources it will need to spend,
during the attack. This describes the cost of each vertex in the attack
graph.
• The attacker aims to choose the path to its goal in the targeted network
with the lowest cost.
We will construct the attack graph considering the above, while using the in-
formation the attacker can get. In this research we assume the attacker has all
the information about the network - topology and vulnerabilities at each host.
2.2. Logical attack graphs
We adopted the definition of logical attack graphs proposed by Ou et al. [7].
Definition 1 (Logical Attack Graph). A logical attack graph is a five-tupple
G = (Np,Ne,Nc,E, g), where Np, Ne, and Nc are disjoint sets of privilege
nodes, exploit nodes, and configuration nodes respectively. E is the set of directed
graph edges E ⊆ (Np×Ne)∪ (Ne× (Np ∪Nc)). g ∈ Np is the attacker’s goal.
Privilege nodes represent the various assets and privileges that can be ac-
quired on the host machines (by using an exploit). Configuration nodes mainly
represent vulnerabilities but can also include various configurations such as the
operating system and services installed on the host.
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Figure 1: Example of logical attack graph. Green diamonds are privilege nodes, Blue ovals
are exploit nodes, Orange rectangles are configuration nodes. Arrows point to the logical
requirement of each node.
Consider for example the attack graph depicted in Figure 1. Consider the
exploit node e1. It can only be activated if configuration c1 is in place and the
privileges p2 and p3 were acquired by the attacker. Once activated, e1 grants
the privilege p1. Alternatively, privilege p1 can be acquired using the exploit
e2.
2.3. Attack graph generation tools:
There are multiple tools for generating logical attack graphs. The most
notable are Network Security Planning Architecture (NetSPA) [12, 13], Graphi-
cal Attack Graph and Reachability Network Evaluation Tool (GARNET) [14],
and multi-host, multi-stage Vulnerability Analysis Language (MulVAL) and
framework [15] which enables automatic and relatively easy generation of at-
tack graphs.
We use MulVAL for generating the attack graphs. MulVAL is a framework
for modeling the interaction of the attacker with vulnerabilities and network
configurations. The inputs to MulVAL are:
• Known exploits and their effects.
• Hosts configurations - including installed software.
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• Network configurations - including VLANs and firewall tables.
• Principals - including users and their permissions.
• Interaction rules for the different parts of the system.
• Policy - what accesses does the system wants to permit.
Most of the configurations required for running MulVAL can be imported
from automatic tools or public sources. For example, known exploits could be
imported from NVD (National Vulnerability Database)[16]. Host configurations
can be imported from automatic network scanners such as Nessus [9]. Once the
configurations are present, they are converted to facts, and rules - the basic
building blocks of MulVAL’s reasoning system. From this point, the facts and
rules can be directly loaded into a Prolog environment and executed. MulVAL
uses XSB Prolog dialect [17] because it averts from re-computation of formerly
calculated facts. This results in a polynomial run time complexity for the attack
simulation phase.
Empirical tests show that in practice, MulVAL is very efficient in computing
attack simulation, even in scenarios including thousands of hosts. In a typical
MulVAL run, it will check if there is a trace that will result in a policy violation
using the facts and rules defined earlier. The result of such run is an attack
graph, containing all the possible paths from the initial configuration to the
goal privileges. MulVAL is a popular tool in recent studies related to attack
graphs. Its advantages are noticeable, and therefore we use it in the current
study.
2.4. Exploitation cost
Common vulnerabilities have been compiled and listed in a system operated
by the MITRE Corporation and the U.S. National Vulnerability Database [16].
Each vulnerability is tagged with a unique CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures) identifier and has a CVSS (Common Vulnerabilities Scoring System)
score, which is an open industry standard for assessing the severity of computer
system security vulnerabilities. CVSS scores are based on two subscores:
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• Impact Subscore - reflects the direct consequence of a successful exploit
and represents the consequence to the impacted component.
• Exploitability Subscore - reflects the ease and technical means by which
the vulnerability can be exploited.
In this study we use the exploitability subscore as a cost weight on configuration
nodes that represent vulnerabilities.
Definition 2 (Vulnerability exploit cost). Let v ∈ Nc be a vulnerability node,
then Cv ∈ [0..1] denotes the normalized cost of exploiting v.
The normalized cost of vulnerability exploit can be obtained by dividing
the exploitability subscore by 10 (CVSS v2.0) or by 3.9 (CVSS v3.0).Future
enhancements using alternative cost functions are discussed in Section 6.
3. Obfuscating the Attack Graph
In this section we describe the idea of obfuscating an attack graph by adding
fake vulnerabilties and approaches for solving it. First we formulate the attack
graph obfuscation as a search problem and discuss the random assignment of
fake vulnerabilties [18] as a baseline approach. Then we employ Depth First
Brand and Bound algorithm to find the optimal solution. In order to speed up
the search process we define a few admissible heuristics and a node ordering
function to guide the search.
3.1. Problem definition
Assume an attack graph G according to Definition 1. All the following nota-
tions are defined with respect to an attack graph G unless specified otherwise.
An attack plan consists of series of exploits along with the relevant vulnera-
bilities and obtained privileges that would lead the attack to obtain the goal
privilege g ∈ Np. In the rest of this paper we will use the terms plan and attack
path interchangeably referring to the following definition:
8
Definition 3 (Attack path). Attack path P ⊆ Np ∪Ne ∪Nc is a collection of
nodes such that
• g ∈ P – the goal node is in P .
• ∀p∈P∩Np∃e∈P∩Ne , (p, e) ∈ E – every privilege in P is obtained by executing
an exploit.
• ∀e∈P∩Ne∀x:(e,x)∈E , x ∈ P – P includes all prerequisites for all its exploits.
In order to execute the attack plan, an adversary should invest effort in
executing all the relevant exploits. We define the cost of an attack plan as the
sum of the normalized costs of exploiting all the relevant vulnerabilities.
Definition 4 (Attack cost). The total cost of executing the attack path P is
defined as the sum of the exploit costs of all the vulnerabilities included in the
path CP =
∑
v∈P∩Nc Cv.
We discuss alternative definitions of attack cost in Section 6.
According to Definition 6, an attack path P may include exploits and vul-
nerabilities that are not necessary to obtain the goal privilege. Assuming that
the attacker will avoid unnecessary actions within the target network we define
an optimal attack plan as follows.
Definition 5. An optimal attack path in an attack graph G is an attack path
having the minimum attack cost: P ∗ = arg minP {CP }
Note that, there might be multiple optimal attack paths in a given attack graph.
We assume that the attack has the data, knowledge, and capabilities to find the
optimal attack plan.
Next we introduce fake vulnerabilities into the attack graph observed by the
attacker in order to manipulate his/her planning decisions. Let vulnerability
v ∈ Nc be fake, for example if it is simulated by the Deception Toolkit [19]. The
binary function fake : Nc → {0, 1} will be used to discriminate fake configu-
ration nodes from real configuration nodes. Any exploit e ∈ Ne that depends
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on the fake vulnerability v, i.e. (e, v) ∈ E, will fail. Note that this approach
for modeling fake vulnerabilities is different from honeypots used to deceive the
attacker [20], where an exploit will typically succeed but will not provide the
attacker with useful privileges. Please refer to Section ?? for pros and cons of
honeypots based deception.
In this study we assume that the attacker cannot identify fake vulnerabilities
before attempting to exploit them. An attacker trying to exploit a fake vulner-
ability v and failing to do so, will realize that this vulnerability is fake and will
cease executing the attack plan in order to avoid unnecessary expenses. Given
the new observation (fake(v) = 1) the attacker may discard previous attack
plans that rely on fake vulnerabilities and re-plan the attack to find alternative
paths. We assume that all privileges obtained by the attacker due to partial
execution of the attack plan remain at his possession and that the attacker will
try optimizing the remainder of the attack plan. We assume that the attacker
will continue doing so until the attack goal is reached. Please refer to Section 6
for a discussion on alternative attacker models that can be used in this frame-
work. We will use the term real attack path to denote a successful attack path
that does not rely on fake vulnerabilities to reach the goal:
Definition 6 (Real attack path). Let P ⊆ Np ∪ Ne ∪ Nc be an attack path
according to Definition 6. P is real attack path if and only if P ‘ = P − {c ∈
Nc : fake(c) = 1} is an attack path as well.
In this paper we optimize the assignments of fake vulnerabilities such that
the overall cost of constructing a real attack path is maximized.
Definition 7 (Attack Graph Obfuscation Problem). Given an attack graph G =
(Np, Ne, Nc, E, g) and a number k of fake vulnerabilities to install find an assign-
ment of fake vulnerabilities fake : Nc → {0, 1} such that:
∑
c∈Nc fake(c) = k
and
Definition 8. PTC(AG)
PTC(AG) is the minimal, perceived by the attacker, total cost of the opti-
mal path in attack graph AG (OPT(AG)). Actually, this is the total cost, the
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attacker estimates it needs to pay, under the assumption that all the appeared
vulnerabilities in the attack graph are valid, and not fake.
In other words, PTC(AG) = Cs,t(OPT (AG)) where s and t are the first and
last nodes in OPT(AG) respectively.
In practice, we compute PTC(AG) as the cost of the output of a planner which
produces an optimal attack plan, given attack graph AG.
Definition 9. AA(AG, {a1, ..., an} The output is an attack graph AG’, con-
structed from assigning the group of assignments: {a1, ..., an}.
Definition 10. APTC(AG) The actual cost the attacker will pay when trying
to reach its target in attack graph AG. Calculating APTC(AG) is as follows
(also described in Algorithm 1):
step 1: We initialize the aptc variable (that accumulates the cost) to zero.
step 2: If the optimal attack path in AG consists of vertexes that were created
due to fake vulnerability assignments (fake vertexes), we add to aptc the cost
from the initial vertex to the first fake vertex in the attack plan.
step 2.1 Now we modify the attack graph AG as follows:
1. We remove the fake assignment, which removes all the vertexes created
due to that.
2. We set to zero the weights of the vertexes the attacker visited on the path
to the first fake vertex.
Then, we iterate to step 2 with the new attack graph AG.
The algorithm stops when the optimal attack path from the source to the target
has no more fake vulnerabilities. The algorithm returns the accumulated aptc.
Lemma 11. If attack graph AG has no fake vulnerabilities, then
PTC(AG) = APTC(AG).
Proof. If attack graph AG has no fake vulnerabilities, there are no re-calculation
of attack plans. Due to the fact that the attack plan produced from attack graph
AG, it does not include vertexes that were added due to fake vulnerabilities
addition. From definition 10, steps 1 and 2 does not accrue at all. So actually
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Figure 2: Random approach: create AG’
APTC(AG) is the total cost of the attack plan produced to AG. In other words
- APTC(AG) = PTC(AG).
3.1.1. Random based approach
For the random baseline approach we obfuscate the attack graph by choosing
the deceptive IPs and the vulnerabilities randomly.
In order to achieve the condition state in equation (1) above, we generate the
following algorithm (see also algorithm 2 and Figure 2):
Given an attack graph AG and N number of desired changes,
step 1: We randomly choose x
[
=(Number of IPs in original network) × (Por-
tion of desired changes in the graph)
]
IPs that will be designated as deceptive
hosts.
step 2: We eliminate incompatible vulnerabilities, by filtering vulnerabilities
that create conflicts with other information known about the given IP address.
This is done by filtering vulnerabilities that do not match the operating system
that exists on the targeted computer. The information gathered about the IP
address was collected earlier by the Nessus scanner [9].
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step 3: We randomly choose how many vulnerabilities to add to each IP ad-
dress. This is done because we want to be as unpredictable as possible, in order
to be invisible and avoid detection by the attacker.
In step 4: we choose x vulnerabilities for each IP address chosen as decep-
tive. These vulnerabilities are randomly selected, with preference to low-cost
vulnerabilities. This is done based on the assumption that adding the same
vulnerabilities can lead to discovery of the defender’s deception by the attacker.
step 5: We create new nodes in the attack graph. For every chosen IP address,
we add the new chosen vulnerabilities to the Nessus file. Then, we regenerate
the attack graph with MulVAL, using the same connectivity as in the original
graph. As a result, new paths to the target are created, some of them con-
sists only of fake vulnerabilities, and some are combined from fake and real
vulnerabilities.
3.1.2. AI search based approach
In this approach we obfuscate the attack graph AG into attack graph AG’,
by using heuristics.
Given an attack graph AG and a number of changes K, we need to find the best K
assignments of fake vulnerabilities in the given network. The best K assignments
are the K assignments that will maximize the adversary’s total attack cost.
Thus, we need to find the AG’ ,that is generated by K fake vulnerabilities
assignments to AG, which maximize APTC(AG’).
We model the problem as a search problem and apply the heuristics described
in [21], adapting them into our problem, and add new heuristic and elements
ordering.
First, we model the problem of vulnerabilities assignments into a search
problem, as we search the group of best k assignments, by adapting the search
space described in [21]:
Search space.
The search space is constructed as a decision tree. In the following discussions
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we will use the terms nodes and transitions to refer the graph elements of the
search space and the terms vertex and edges to refer to the graph elements of
the input attack graph. Every node (denoted by V) maintains two collections:
1. Assignments (denoted by A(V)) - group of vulnerability assignments to
an IP address. for example:
< V ulnerability1, IP1 >,< V ulnerability2, IP2 >, ... < V ulnerabilityl, IPl >
2. Candidate assignments (denoted by AC(V)) - an ordered list of possible
vulnerability assignments to an IP address. for example:
< V ulnerability1, IP1 >,< V ulnerability2, IP2 >, ... < V ulnerabilityl, IPm >
The order of assignments candidate in AC(V) may vary between different as-
signments in A(V) group. The methods of ordering the assignments in AC(V)
will be described in Section 3.1.2 we will refer to the first assignment in the
ordered list AC(V) as acbest. We will refer to the search space as a decision
tree. Thus, at every node we decide whether acbest is included in the final k
assignments. According to this decision we branch to either of the two sub-trees,
one containing all the groups that include acbest and the other containing all
the groups that do not include it. Thus we assure that all possible solutions can
be found during the search.
Every node has two children:
• Left child (denoted by V −).
– Has assignments group as V :
A(V −) = A(V)
– Has candidate list which contain all the assignments from the candi-
dates list of V excluding acbest:
AC(V −) = AC(V) \ {acbest}
• Right child (denoted by V +).
– Has all the assignments of V , additionally including acbest:
A(V +) = A(V) ∪ acbest
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– Has candidates list which contain all the assignments from the can-
didates list of V excluding acbest:
AC(V +) = AC(V) \ {acbest}
The root node of the tree represents an empty group of assignments. Its
candidates list contains all the possible assignments to the graph, under the
assumption that if the cost of vulnerability x and vulnerability y equals and
they have the same pre and post conditions, assignment of vulnerability x to a
specific IP is the same as assigning y to the same IP. Every child of the root node
holds a candidate list that is missing one assignment and a group that includes
one assignment or none. All nodes at the second level hold a candidates list
that is missing two assignments and a group that includes zero, one, or two
assignments, etc.
Since we are looking for a group of size K, we will refer to nodes with |A(V )| = K
as possible solutions to our problem. We exclude from the search space all sub-
trees that do not contain a possible solution. These can be either sub-trees
rooted at nodes with |A(V )| > K or sub-trees rooted at nodes with |AC(V )|+
|A(V )| < K.
Figure 3 presents an example of a tree representing the search space of the
Figure 3: Example of a tree representing the search space
vulnerabilities assignment problem with K=2 and l=3. Dashed lines represent
sub-trees that do not contain a possible solution, and therefore will be pruned.
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The set in curly braces {...} represents A(V) and the list in parenthesis (...)
represents AC(V).
The search should start at the root node R whose assignment group is empty
and the candidates list is (a1, a2, a3) and ac
best = a1. We consider all groups
where a1 is a member by moving to the right child (following the ”+” transition).
R+ maintains the group {a1} and a candidates list that includes all possible
assignments, excluding the assignment a1. It is possible that the order of the
assignments in AC(R+) is different from the order of assignments in AC(R) (See
section 3.1.2). We consider all groups where a1 is not a member by following the
transition ”-” from the root node. R− maintains an empty group and candidates
list that is identical to the candidates list of R+.
Heuristics Search Algorithm.
The input to this algorithm is:
1. AG - the attack graph produced from the given network.
2. P - attack planner.
We investigated the effect of two search algorithms on this problem - DF-BnB
and A*.
A*:
We use the A* algorithm to search for a quicker solution to our problem. A*
is a best-first search algorithm, meaning that it solves problems by searching
among all possible paths to the solution while considering first the paths that
appear to lead most quickly to the solution.
DF-BnB:
We use the Depth First Branch and Bound (DF-BnB) algorithm [22] to search
the tree for the group of assignments which produce an attack plan with maxi-
mal attacker’s cost.
DFBnB is known to be effective when the depth of the search tree is known, as
in our case. DFBnB is similar to DFS but it prunes nodes according to a global
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bound. Under the assumption that the given planner (P) finds the optimal so-
lution, we begin the search with a bound equal to PTC(AG). Which is the cost
of the optimal path in attack graph AG. During the search, the bound is equal
to the maximal utility found so far.
In contrast to the traditional search that is aimed at finding the node with
minimal cost, we are using a utility based approach. We define the utility of
the node V (denoted by U(V)) as APTC(AA(AG,A(V))).
A heuristic function h(V) estimates the maximal utility that can be gained
by exploring the sub-tree rooted at V. f(V) = g(V)+h(V) is a function that
estimates the maximal utility of nodes in V’s sub-tree.
The utility of the root node R is equal to APTC(AG, {}) = PTC(AG) (see
lemma 11), because A(R) = ∅ and adding zero assignments to the attack graph
produce an attack plan with optimal cost. h(R) is an upper bound on the
optimal solution. While searching down the tree, g(V) will grow and h(V) will
decrease. When the algorithm finds a possible solution, h(V) is equal to zero
and f(V) is equal to APTC(AA(AG,A(V))). While necessarily |A(V )| = K.
Pruning decisions made during the search are based on the value of f(V) and
the maximal APTC found so far. We can guarantee that the heuristic search
will find the optimal solution only if the function f(V) is an upper bound on
the maximal APTC that can be found within the sub-tree rooted at V. If this
upper bound is below the maximal APTC found so far, the sub-tree is pruned,
otherwise it is explored in hope of finding a group with a higher APTC. Heuristic
functions used for pruning nodes in the search tree are described in section 3.1.2.
When visiting a node, beside the decision whether to prune the current sub-tree,
the algorithm should also determine acbest. The following section describes two
methods of ordering assignments in AC(V) and determining acbest.
Assignments ordering in the candidates list.
Admissible heuristic functions guarantee that during the search we will find the
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optimal solution (note that the search may take an exponential time). The order
of the assignments in AC(V) is important for choosing acbest and for comput-
ing admissible pruning heuristics. The order of assignments in AC(V) can be
determined by either their individual utility or their contribution to the given
chosen assignments:
High utility first ordering
We can sort the assignments in AC(V) by their individual utility (the utility
of an assignment a ∈ A(V ) is APTC(AA(AG,a))). That means that the first
assignment in A(V) will be the assignment with the highest individual utility.
The computation of APTC(AA(AG,a)) needs to be done in the pre-processing
phase, for each assignment. But, it can be done once for the entire search.
Sorting assignments by their individual utility will impose the same order on all
candidates lists in the tree.
The ideal placement of a fake vulnerability will be by making each assignment
create a new path to the goal with a lower cost than the optimal path in the
given attack graph AG (PTC(AA(AG, {a1})) < PTC(AG), when a1 ∈ A(V )).
If this situation is impossible, we will need couple of assignments in order to
create new path. But, after the attacker will reveal the first fake vulnerability,
the other assignments that created the new path, are now redundant. Dur to
that, this solution is inferior to the previews one, due to it’s wastefulness.
By ordering the assignments list by the assignment with the highest utility first,
we can find paths that created due to one fake vulnerability assignment.
Shortest path first ordering
We can sort the assignments in AC(V) by considering the assignments selected
so far.
If the solution described in the previous paragraph is uncommon, we need to
find the shortest paths we can produce to the goal. That means, we need to find
the smallest group of fake assignments that can give us a new path to the goal
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with a lower cost than the optimal path in the given attack graph AG. Thereby
we are using our budget carefully.
Due to that, the contribution of the assignments in CA(V) should be recalcu-
lated each time the search algorithm moves to the right child (by adding acbest
to A(V)). In pre-processing phase we calculate all the possible paths from the
source to the target in the given attack graph AG, and ordering them from the
shortest path to the longest. According to the assignments in A(V), we need to
find the smallest group of Ips that can create a path to the goal. We used the
inverted index data structure in order to that efficiently.
In Figure 4 we show an example of extracting the best candidates when given a
node V in the search tree. By finding for every IP ∈ ai, where ai ∈ A(V ), the
paths it is part of. Then finding the smallest group of best candidates.
Figure 4: Example of extracting the best IP addresses candidates using inverted index
Heuristic evaluation functions.
In this problem, we need to find the assignment which produces the maximum
utility, it is a maximum problem. A heuristic function in a maximum problem
is admissible, if in every node v, in the search space, it holds that h(v), which is
an upper bound on the remaining reward of an optimal solution from the start
to a goal via v (denoted as h∗(v)) [23].
The proposed functions differ in their computation time and precision.
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h1 (utility upper bound)
h1(V ) =
K−|A(V )|∑
i=1
(APTC(AA(AG, {aci}))),
Where aci ∈ AC(V) is the i’th place in the candidate list AC(V).
In h1(V ), we sum the APTC of the graph constructed from applying each as-
signment from the K - |A(V )| assignments in the ordered candidates list AC(V).
Admissibility:
h1 is not admissible. We will show an example in order to show that:
We denote prep(i) as the previous vertex of vertex i in path p.
Figure 5: Example of non-admissibility of heuristic h1
We denote postp(i) as the next vertex of vertex i in path p.
Let AG be the given original graph. Let the root node in the search tree be R,
where A(R) = ∅ and AC(R) = c1, c2, where c1 = (IP1, v1) and c2 = (IP2, v2)
and IP1 6= IP2.
We denote the attack graph, produced from assigning the fake assignments c1
and c2, as AG
∼. AG∼ = AA(AG, {c1, c2}).
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Assume that applying both c1 and c2 creates a new path to the target vertex
(denoted as p∼) and PTC(AG∼)¡PTC(AG).
Furthermore, let’s assume that applying only c1 or c2 doesn’t create a new path
to the goal such that APTC(AG1)=APTC(AG) and APTC(AG2)=APTC(AG),
when AG1 and AG2 are the graph constructed from adding assignment c1 or
assignment c2 to attack graph AG, accordingly.
Let’s assume that the new path p∼ is as follows: p∼ = (s, ..., (fv)1, ..., (fv)2, ..., t).
Where (fv)1 and (fv)2 be the fact vertexes added due to adding c1 and c2 as-
signments accordingly.
For simplicity, let’s assign the following costs:
Cs,t(OPTs,t(AG)) = 10, Cs,t(OPTs,t(AG
∼)) = 9, Cs,post(fv1)(OPTs,t(AG
∼)) = 6,
Cpre(fv1),t(OPTpre(fv1),t(AG
2)) = 9, Cpre(fv1),post(fv2)(OPTpre(fv1),t(AG
2)) = 7,
Cpre(fv2),t(OPTpre(fv2),t(AG)) = 9
We describe the case of applying both c1 and c2:
First, the adversary’s attack plan is equal to path p∼ (because
PTC(AG∼) < PTC(AG)). When it tries to preform the attack plan, it starts
at vertex s, and continue until it tries to exploit postp∼(fv1) - the action vertex
enabled due to applying vulnerability v1 to IP IP1. The attacker will fail when
trying to exploit this vertex, due to the fact that the vulnerability is fake. The
adversary now removes the fake vulnerability v1 from IP IP1, and constructs
a new attack graph which is similar to AG2, but does not loose the privileges
he already gained. Thus, The attacker will try to find the best path from s or
pre(fv1) to t. Since Cpre(fv1),t(OPTpre(fv1),t(AG
2)) < Cs,t(OPTs,t(AG)) the
attacker will choose the optimal path from pre(fv1) to t.
It will continue to exploit vulnerabilities until it reaches fv2 tries to exploit
it and fails, again. The adversary now constructs AG again, while not loos-
ing all the privileges it gained so far. Now, Cpre(fv2),t(OPTpre(fv2),t(AG)) <
Cs,t(OPTs,t(AG)) so the adversary will choose the path from pre(fv2) to t.
So, to sum up the total cost for the adversary during its path:
APTC(AG∼) = Cs,post(fv1)(OPTs,t(AG
∼))+Cpre(fv1),post(fv2)(OPTpre(fv1),t(AG
2))+
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Cpre(fv2),t(OPTpre(fv2),t(AG)) = 6 + 7 + 9 = 22 > 9 = PTC(AG
∼)
But, h1(R) = APTC(AA(AG, {c1})) + APTC(AA(AG, {c2})) = 20 < 22 =
APTC(AA(AG, {c1, c2})) = h∗(R)
h2 (admissible utility upper bound)
h2 is similar to h1, but with an addition:
h2(V ) = PTC(AG) +
K−|A(V )|∑
i=1
(APTC(AA(AG, {aci}))),
Where aci ∈ AC(V) is the i’th place in the candidate list AC(V).
In h2(V ), we sum PTC(AG) to the APTC of the graph constructed from apply-
ing each assignment from the K - |A(V )| assignments in the ordered candidates
list AC(V)
Admissibility:
The heuristic h2 is admissible, in order to prove it, we need to prove that for all
v the following is true:
h2(v) ≥ h∗(v)
We used the following lemma in order to prove it:
Lemma 12. Let AG be an attack graph with no fake vulnerabilities, then:
ATPC(AA(AG, {a1, a2, ..., ak})) ≤ (k + 1) ∗ATPC(AG)
Proof. We will prove it using induction:
Basis: k=0
ATPC(AA(AG, {})) = APTC(AG) ≤ (0 + 1) ∗ATPC(AG)
Let AG(k − 1) = AA(AG,{a1, a2, ..., a(k − 1)}) Let’s assume that for k-1 the
following is true:
ATPC(AG(k − 1)) ≤ k ∗ATPC(AG)
We add another assignment to the attack graph AG(k−1), so AG(k) = AA(AG(k−
1), {ak}). The best case is that the new assignment constructs a new path to
the goal such that C(s, t)(OPT(s, t)(AG
(k)) ≤ C(s, t)(OPT(s, t)(AG(k − 1))
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and of course C(s, t)(OPT(s, t)(AG
(k)) ≤ C(s, t)(OPT(s, t)(AG). The attacker
will try to execute OPT(s, t)(AG
(k)), then after trying to exploit the fake
vulnerability, it fails and tries to find a new path in AG(k − 1) (let’s as-
sume that in the best case, the privileges gained so far did not help). So,
in the best case: ATPC(AGk) = C(s, t)(OPT(s, t)(AG)+ATPC(AG
(k−1)) ≤
PTC(AG) + k ∗ATPC(AG) =∗ (k + 1) ∗ATPC(AG)
* - lemma 11
Lemma 13. Let AG be an attack graph with no fake vulnerabilities, and ai =<
IPi, V uli > is a possible assignment, then:
ATPC(AA(AG, {ai})) ≥ ATPC(AG)
Proof. If the assignment of V uli in IPi, creates a new optimal path to the goal
(that means PTC(AA(AG, {ai})) ≤ PTC(AG)), so ATPC(AA(AG, {ai})) will
be equal to the sum of the following paths:
• First, the attacker will construct an attack plan from the attack graph
AG′ = AA(AG, {ai}). The adversary will try to exploit all the exploit
vertexes to the goal, until it will try to exploit V uli and fails. Until then,
it will pay Cs,action(V uli)(AG
′) - the cost of the path from source (s) to the
action vertex added due to the existence of the fake vulnerability V uli.
• Now, after the adversary realizes that the vulnerability it tries to exploit
(V uli) is fake, it will remove the fake information from the attack graph
and re-plans its path to the goal. The new attack graph considers the fact
that the attacker does not loose privileges. So x=min
{
Cs,t(OPT (AG)), Cprev(action(V uli)),t(OPT (AG))
}
is added to path cost of the previous step.
If ATPC(AA(AG, {ai})) = Cs,action(V uli)(AG′) + Cs,t(OPT (AG)) then
ATPC(AA(AG, {ai})) ≥ Cs,t(OPT (AG)) = ATPC(AG)
If ATPC(AA(AG, {ai})) = Cs,action(V uli)(AG′)+Cprev(action(V uli)),t(OPT (AG))
then
ATPC(AA(AG, {ai})) ≥ Cs,t(OPT (AG)) = ATPC(AG)
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otherwise, let p′ =< s, ..., prev(action(V uli), ..., t > the path from the source
s to the target t via the previous vertex to action(V uli), then Cs,t(p
′) <
Cs,t(OPT (AG)) in contrast to the Optimality of OPT(AG). So, necessarily
ATPC(AA(AG, {ai})) ≥ ATPC(AG).
Using the above lemma we prove the admissibility of h2.
We can see that h∗(V ) = APTC(AA(AG,
{
ac1, ac2, ..., acK−|A(V )|
}
))−
APTC(AA(AG,A(V )))
Where aci is the i’th element in AC(V ).
Because it is the remaining reward of an optimal solution from the start to a
goal via V
h2(V ) = PTC(AG)+
∑K−|A(V )|
i=1 (APTC(AA(AG, {aci}))) ≥Lemma13 PTC(AG)+
(K−|A(V )|)∗APTC(AG) ≥Lemma11 APTC(AG)+(K−|A(V )|)∗APTC(AG) =
(K+1−|A(V )|)∗APTC(AG) ≥Lemma12 APTC(AA(AG,{a1, a2, ..., aK−|A(V )|})) ≥
h∗(V )
We can see that h2(V ) ≥ h∗(V ) and as result h2 is admissible.
Assignments cost. - under the constrain that we have K assignments to add to
the given attack graph, the cost of every assignment a ∈ A(V ) is 1. Hence, if
the budget is x, we can choose x assignments to add, and that is exactly what
we want.
Pre-Processing.
During the pre-processing step, we calculate the PTC(AG, {a}), for each po-
tential a ∈ AC(root).
Further more, we eliminate incompatible vulnerabilities for each IP, by filter-
ing vulnerabilities that create conflicts with other information known about the
given IP address. This is done by filtering vulnerabilities that do not match the
operating system that exists on the targeted computer.
To enable the filtering, information about the IP address is collected using the
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Nessus scanner [9]. The information about each vulnerability is gathered from
the National Vulnerability Database [16].
4. Evaluation
We need to produce an attack graph in order to model all the possible paths
from the adversary’s source (usually the Internet) to its target in the network.
Two types of input are required to create an attack graph: a list of existing
vulnerabilities in the network hosts (Data collection), which can be gathered
using Nessus scan [9], and the topology of the network.
4.1. Data
In order to measure the effectiveness of our method we needed real data
that represent a real network. We collected data using a Nessus [9] scan of an
organization. This network consists of 150 hosts and had 394 vulnerabilities.
We used an automatic tool, called MulVAL, for constructing the attack graph
from the real network. [[RP:Cite our previous papers for the data.]]
The organizational network exhibited a standard topology of a small enter-
prise:
• DMZ - the network accessible from the Internet.
• Internal network.
• Secured network - the network in which all the important assets were
located.
4.2. Attack graph generation tool
Due to all the strengths we mention in section 2.2, we chose logical attack
graph as a model for our problem. In order to produce a logical attack graph,
we used a state of the art attack graph generation tool called MulVAL [15].
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Attack planner. In order to obtain the optimal attack plan, with minimal cost,
we use Jorg Huffman’s converter [24] [25] in order to convert our problem to
PDDL (Planning Domain Definition Language) file.
We solve the PDDL file obtained in the previous step using the fast-downward
planner [26] which we executed with the A* search algorithm using the landmark-
cut heuristic function. The landmark-cut function is admissible, so the algo-
rithm would eventually find an optimal solution to the goal.
Figure 6: Evaluation process
4.3. Proof of concept
We used Fred Cohens Deception ToolKit (DTK) [19] in order to generate
deceptive information about a host (runs Linux OS). We used the guidelines
detailed in [27]. Applying the DTK on a system causes it to appear to attackers
as having a large number of widely known vulnerabilities. When the attacker
issues a command or request the DTK results with a pre-defined response, in
order to encourage the attacker to continue its exploration of the host. The De-
ception tool kit is a set of C programs, Perl scripts, and additions/modifications
to host configuration files.
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4.4. Defining evaluation measures
We evaluated our method using four evaluation measures:
1. p1 = Number of recalculation - this number counts the number of times
the attacker needs to recalculate its plan due to fake vulnerability. It is
increased each time the adversary’s attack plan includes of fake vulnera-
bilities and re-planning is needed.
2. p2 = Total time - total planning time (the time it took for the attacker to
plan its path to reach the goal).
3. p3 = Relative increase of the attacker’s cost - calculated as
total cost
original cost .
The total cost, is the total cost the attacker invest during the attack of
the network after the obfuscation, and the original cost is the total cost
the attacker invest during the attack of the original network, with no ob-
fuscation.
4. p4 = Precision - The number of fake assignments the attacker encounters
in its path to the goal, relative to the number of fake assignments placed in
the attack graph. More accurate the precision = number of recalculation − 1budget
The procedure of calculating these measures is presented in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3 Evaluating success measures
Input: AG, numOfFakeAssignments ← number of fake assignments placed in
the attack graph, originalCost
Output: reCalculation, relativeIncreaseOfCost, totalTime, precision
1: reCalculation, totalPlanCost, totalTime ← 0
2: i← 1
3: Let Assignments = ((IP1, v1), (IP2, v2)...(IPm, vn)) ⇐ all the assignment
of fake vulnerabilities to IPs.
4: timeStart = now()
5: AG’ ← AA(AG,assignments)
6: pi = (u1, u2, ...um)← OPT (AG′)
7: timeEnd = now()
8: flag = True
9: while flag do
10: flag = False
11: if ∃k, such that uk is a vertex created from some fake assignment a ∈
Assignments then
12: flag = True
13: totalPlanCost = totalPlanCost +
∑k
j=1 C(uj)
14: totalTime = totalTime + (timeEnd - timeStart)
15: currExpNodes ← expanded nodes during the current planning
16: for vertex ∈ OPT(AG’) do
17: if vertex != uk then
18: cost(uk) = 0
19: else
20: break
21: end if
22: end for
23: timeStart = now()
24: AG’ ← removeVertexFromAttackGraph(AG’,a)
25: pi = (u1, u2, ...um)← OPT (AG′)
26: timeEnd = now()
27: end if
28: i ∈ i + 1
29: reCalculation = reCalculation +1
30: end while
31: precision ← reCalculation−1numOfFakeAssignments
32: relativeIncreaseOfCost ← total costoriginal cost
33: return reCalculation, relativeIncreaseOfCost, totalTime, precision
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Algorithm 1 APTC(AG)
Input: AG
Output: APTC(AG)
1: aptc ← 0
2: i← 1
3: Let Assignments = ((IP1, v1), (IP2, v2)...(IPm, vn)) ⇐ all the fake assign-
ments of fake vulnerabilities to IPs.
4: AG’ ← AG
5: pi = (u1, u2, ...um)← OPT (AG′)
6: flag = True
7: while flag do
8: flag = False
9: if ∃k, such that uk is a vertex created from some fake assignment a ∈
Assignments then
10: Let uk be the first node which maintains the above.
11: flag = True
12: aptc = aptc +
∑k
j=1 C(uj)
13: for vertex ∈ OPT(AG’) do
14: if vertex != uk then
15: cost(uk) = 0
16: else
17: break
18: end if
19: end for
20: AG’ ← removeNodeFromAttackGraph(AG’,a)
21: pi = (u1, u2, ...um)← OPT (AG′)
22: end if
23: i ∈ i + 1
24: end while
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Algorithm 2 Create AG’
Input: AttackGraph AG, numofChanges
Output: AG’
1: AG’ = AG
2: pickedIps← list of random chosen IPs from AttackGraph
3: for each IP ip ∈ pickedIps do
4: currentV ulList← list of all vulnerabilities exist in ip
5: OSV ersion← getOSVersion(RVu)
6: vulList← list of all vulnerabilities associate with OSV ersion
7: validOSList← vulList \ currentV ulList
8: numOfV ulToAdd← Random(0, validOSList← Size())
9: chosenV ul←
10: chooseRandomList(validOSList, numOfV ulToAdd)
11: AddNodes(AG′, IP, chosenV ul)
12: end forreturn AG’
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Correctness: Due to the monotonic assumption [28] (mentioned in section
3.1), we assume that if an attacker gains some privileges in the network, it
does not loose them. The evaluation measures are calculated considering this
assumption.
For calculating the evaluation measures we identified two cases:
1. If the attacker tries to exploit a fake vulnerability, it invests the associated
cost and then replans a path to the goal, taking into account the achieve-
ments made thus far. The parameters are calculated as follows, in each
iteration:
• Total time is calculated as the sum of all the time it took to produce
all the attack plans so far.
• Expected cost is calculated as the sum of:
– The costs of all of the vertexes in the attack plan that preceded
the vertex which contains the fake vulnerability (including the
vertex itself).
– The total cost the attacker spent until this point (in all of its
previous iterations).
• Number of recalculations is computed as the number of attack plans
that include fake vulnerabilities, so far, plus 1 (current).
2. If the attacker successfully reaches the goal, it means that the attack plan
was devoid of fake vulnerabilities. In this case, the measures are calculated
as follows:
• Total time is calculated as the sum of the time it took to plan the
path to the target and the total time the attacker spent during all
the attack plans so far.
• Expected cost is calculated as the sum of the costs of all of the
vertexes in the attack plan and the total cost the attacker spent
spent during all the attack plans so far.
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• Number of recalculations is calculated as the number of recalculations
so far plus 1.
The relative increase of the attacker’s cost calculated as the total cost (the
total cost the attacker invest during the attack of the network after the obfus-
cation) encountered out of the original cost (the total cost the attacker invest
during the attack of the original network, with no obfuscation). And mathe-
matically, total costoriginal cost .
The precision is calculated as the fraction of the number of fake vulnera-
bilities the attacker encountered out of the total number of fake vulnerabilities
added to the attack graph ( reCalculation−1numOfFakeAssignments ).
We compute the planCost, taking into account the fact that the adversary
stops carrying out its attack plan when it is interrupted by a fake vulnerabil-
ity. Therefore, the cost of the attack plan is the sum of all of the exploitable
vulnerabilities, including the cost of trying to exploit the fake vulnerability.
In order to follow the monotonic assumption, in each iteration, we nullify the
cost of all of the vertexes in the attack plan until the first fake vertex. From this
vertex on, the attacker cannot execute the attack as planned or gain additional
privileges.
4.5. Results
In this section we present the results of the two approaches: the random
and the AI search approach. First, we evaluate each of the two approaches
separately, and then we compare the two.
Platform. In all the experiments presented in this section we used a virtual
machine who runs an Ubuntu 12.04.5 with a Linux kernel 3.13.0-95. System
with a 4 Virtual CPU, 2Tb Disk and 8G RAM.
The resources were fully dedicated to our experiments.
32
Figure 7: Attack graph of NET80
On each experiment, we followed the steps described in section 3 to generate an
attack graph and assign fake vulnerabilities.
4.5.1. Random approach
Implementation:.
The purpose of this experiments were as follows:
1. Check the feasibility of the attack graph obfuscation.
2. Check the precision and scalability of the random approach.
• Data set:
This experiments conducted to a sub-network (NET80) of the network
described in section 4.1 that consists of 80 hosts (see the attack graph in
Figure 7).
• Parameters:
– Budget:
33
1. 10% of the network (8 hosts) chosen as deceptive.
2. 30% of the network (24 hosts) chosen as deceptive.
3. 50% of the network (40 hosts) chosen as deceptive.
For each budget amount, we repeated the experiments five times. At each trial,
the number of chosen fake vulnerabilities for each host is randomly chosen. At
each trial, a new obfuscated attack graph is constructed. The results in the
following section present the average for all the trials conducted for each evalu-
ated budget amount including zero (no deception). Table 1 provides the attack
graphs’ data, which includes the attack graphs’ average number of vertexes,
edges, and vulnerabilities relative to the budget.
Deceptive IPs Vertexes Edges Vulnerabilities
0% 10147 16591 140
10% 10815 18421 164.2
30% 12392.8 22591 220.6
50% 13936.8 26734.4 257.2
Table 1: Attack graph data
Results:.
We present results for the attacker cost during the planning and attack phases.
The results are presented in Figure 8 and Figure 9 followed with further expla-
nations.
In Figure 9, we can see the precision of the random approach. We can see that
as the budget increase, the total cost increase, but not in the same proportion
as the number of computers defined as deceptive. Thus, we can see that even
by choosing 10% of the computers as deceptive, we can get a result close to the
result obtained from the choice of 50% of the computers as deceptive.
In Figure 8, we can see the values of the attacker’s total time invested, rela-
tive increase of the attacker’s cost and the number of recalculation, relative to
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Figure 8: Random approach results
the portion of computers chosen as deceptive. We can see that as the portion of
deceptive computers increased, the attacker’s effort increased. Next we discuss
the results depicted in Figure 8.
• We measure the attacker’s effort during the planning phase (p2). Table 2
shows the increase in planning time relative to the baseline.
% of deceptive computers total time
10% 2.5
30% 3
50% 4.7
Table 2: Planing time relative to baseline
It can be observed that even for only 10% deceptive computers the plan-
ning time is more than double, and it grows with the number of deceptive
computers.
• We evaluate the attacker’s effort during the attack phase through the
relative increase of the attacker’s cost (p3).
Table 3 presents the relative increase of the attacker’s cost.
As observed from Table 1 and Table 3 it can be seen that just a small
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Figure 9: Random approach precision
% of deceptive computers relative increase of the attacker’s cost
10% 1.46
30% 1.53
50% 1.6
Table 3: Total attack path cost relative to baseline
amount of fake vulnerabilities is needed to effectively waste the adversary’s
resources, and more specifically that by randomly adding vulnerabilities
to less than 30% of the computers in the network can cost the adversary
almost 1.5 times more.
• We evaluate the number of recalculations, which is the number of times
the attacker needs to recalculate its plan due to fake vulnerabilities. Table
4 presents the number of recalculation relative to the number of deceptive
computers chosen.
As observed from Table 4 it can be seen that just a small amount of fake
vulnerabilities is needed to effectively duplicate the needed recalculations.
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% of deceptive computers Number of recalculations
10% 2.2
30% 2.4
50% 3
Table 4: Number of recalculations
More specifically that by randomly adding vulnerabilities to less than 10%
of the computers in the network the number of recalculations duplicates.
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4.5.2. AI search approach
. Implementation:
This experiment conducted in order to:
1. Examine which algorithm parameters provide better results in terms of
run-time and precision.
2. Determine whether the AI search approach has better precision than the
random approach.
3. Determine whether the AI search approach is feasible for large networks.
• Data set:
For evaluation needs, and in order to test our approach on challenging
and interesting networks, we created four sub-networks from the network
described in section 4.1, using the same topology:
1. NET4 - a subset network which created with 4 hosts.
You can see Figure 10 the constructed attack graph (AG).
Number of vertexes: 96
Number of edges: 136
2. NET10 - a subset network which created with 10 hosts
You can see Figure 11 the constructed attack graph (AG).
Number of vertexes: 486
Number of edges: 728
3. NET20 - a subset network which created with 20 hosts.
You can see Figure 12 the constructed attack graph (AG).
Number of vertexes: 2179
Number of edges: 3685
• Parameters:
For the AI search approach we compared numerous configurations of the
parameters (described in section 3.1.2):
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Figure 10: Attack graph of NET4
– Two search algorithms:
1. A*
2. DF-BnB
– Three assignments ordering of the candidates list:
1. High utility first ordering
2. Shortest path first ordering
3. Random ordering
– Two heuristic evaluation functions:
1. h1 (utility upper bound)
2. h2 (admissible utility upper bound)
– Budgets:
1. Budget of 3 assignments
2. Budget of 5 assignments
Results.
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Figure 11: Attack graph of NET10
1. Heuristic evaluation functions - the heuristics evaluation functions
differ in the number of expanded nodes during the search, which effect the
total time and the achieved total cost (which reflect the amount of effort
the adversary is putting into it’s attack).
• Precision - which is the number of fake vulnerabilities the attacker
try to exploit during the attack, relative to the budget. In other
words, the precision is equal to number of recalculation − 1budget , due to the
fact that the number of recalculations is the number of attack plan
consists fake vulnerabilities + 1 (the attack plan which consists valid
path to the goal).
The precision is 1, for each of the heuristics. Which means that
all the assignments chosen by the search algorithm were deceptive to
the attacker. In practice, each fake assignment, was tested by the
attacker. This maximizes the adversary’s setback while trying to
reach its goal in the targeted network. But, if the budget is greater
than the assignments needed, our algorithm choose the minimum
number of assignments which can optimally increase the attacker’s
efforts (see Figure 13). For example, in NET20, when the budget
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Figure 12: Attack graph of NET20
was 5, the best fake vulnerability assignment were the same as the
optimal assignment for a budget of 4 (= 5∗0.8), so there was no need
for 5 assignments.
Figure 13: Budget Usage
• Relative increase of the attacker’s cost = total costoriginal cost .
The total cost, is the total cost the attacker invest during the attack
of the network after the obfuscation, and the original cost is the total
cost the attacker invest during the attack of the original network, with
no obfuscation.
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We can see that the non-admissible heuristic can give a non-optimal
solution, which is shown in the results presented in Figure 14. In
NET20 network, the AI search, using the non-admissible heuristic
precision was 1 but the chosen hosts did not gave an optimal solution.
Figure 14: Relative increase of the attacker’s cost for each heuristic
• Expanded nodes - The difference between the expanded nodes,
for each of the heuristics is negligible. For the networks NET4 and
NET10 there were no difference in the number of expanded nodes,
the only difference were for the network NET20.
We omitted the assignments random ordering, due to the fact that the
random selection can not provide valid information in this subject.
Figure 15, present the number of expanded nodes for network NET20.
The expanded nodes where higher in the case of using the admissible
heuristic with DFBnB search algorithm, for budget of five hosts, by
using the high utility first ordering.
The actual difference is in 7% more, for the admissible heuristic,
which is negligible.
• Search total time - the search total time, is a direct result of the
number of the search expanded nodes. Same here, the differences in
the total time between the admissible heuristic to the non-admissible
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Figure 15: Heuristics expanded nodes, in network NET20
is negligible. For the networks NET4 and NET10 there were no dif-
ference in the total time, the only difference were for network NET10.
Figure 16, present the total search time for the network NET20.
Figure 16: Heuristics total time, in network NET20
2. Assignments ordering - the purpose of the various heuristics for can-
didates ordering (in the ordered assignment candidates list AC(V)) is to
reduce the number of nodes created during the search. As a result,
the total time of the search will be reduced.
From the results (see Figure 17) we can see that usually the random ap-
proach performs worse than the proposed ordering heuristics - shortest
path first and high utility first. whose results are usually similar.
3. Search algorithms comparison -
43
Figure 17: Expanded nodes by candidate assignments ordering type
• Expanded nodes - we can see that A* is a better search algorithm
for solving this problem, because the number of expanded nodes is
larger for the DFBnB algorithm, than the A* algorithm (as shown
in Figure 18). We can see that for all network sizes (4, 10 and 20
hosts) and for all the tested budgets (3 or 5), the number of expanded
nodes using the A* is smaller than the number of expanded nodes
using DFBnB search algorithm.
Figure 18: Expanded nodes for each search algorithm
• Total search time - we can see that as a result of the number of
expanded nodes, the total time it took to find the optimal solution
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in A* is better than in DFBnB (as shown in Figure 19).
Figure 19: Total search time for each search algorithm
From the results it can be concluded that in order to solve this problem,
A* preform better than DFBnB.
4.5.3. Random approach vs. AI search approach
Implementation:.
In this section we demonstrate that the AI approach is preferable to the random
approach in utilizing the budget in the most efficient way.
• Data set: For evaluation needs, and in order to test our approach on
challenging and interesting networks, we created four sub-networks from
the network described in section 3, using the same topology:
1. NET10 - as shown in Figure 11 (page 38).
2. NET20 - as shown in Figure 12 (page 38).
3. NET50 - a subset network which created with 50 hosts.
You can see in Figure 20 the constructed attack graph (AG).
Number of vertexes: 10,203
Number of edges: 16,621
4. NET80 - as shown in Figure 7 (page 33). The attack graph consists
of 10,147 vertexes and 16,591 edges.
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Figure 20: Attack graph of the sub network with 50 hosts
• Parameters:
– AI approach parameters:
1. Budget - We started the trials on the AI approach with small
budgets in order to demonstrate that the impact on the attacker
(relative increase of the attacker’s cost) can be significant, even
with a small budget. Then, we examine what should be the
provided budget as input to the random algorithm, in order to
reach the same results. This enables us to show the significant
differences between the two different algorithms, even for low
budgets.
2. Search algorithm - We chose the A* search algorithm, due
to its effectiveness in terms of runtime, as seen in the results
presented in section 4.5.2.
3. Assignments ordering of the candidates list - We chose
the high utility first ordering, due to its effectiveness in terms of
runtime, as seen in the results presented in section 4.5.2.
4. Heuristic evaluation function - We chose the admissible util-
ity upper bound evaluation function, due to the fact it provides
an optimal solution and is not poor in terms of running time, as
shown in the results presented in section 4.5.2.
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– Random approach parameters:
1. Budget - We examine all the possible budgets from 1 deceptive
computer to n − 1, where n is number of hosts in the network.
Then we matched the results to the results given by the AI ap-
proach.
2. Trials - For each budget, we repeated the experiments five times.
The results in the following section present the average for all the
trials conducted for each budget. Therefore, at each trial, a new
obfuscated attack graph is constructed.
At each trial, the number of chosen fake vulnerabilities for each
host is randomly chosen.
Results.
In this section we demonstrate that the AI approach is preferable to random
approach in terms of optimal results.
The two approaches has clear trade offs:
• Total search time - As in all cases and since the random approach
have no ”smart” choices, the random approach is much faster than the AI
search algorithm.
• Relative increase of the attacker’s cost - The effect on the attacker
described and explained in page 41 as the relative increase of the attacker’s
cost.
Unlike the random approach, by using the AI search approach we can
maximize the given budget for hardening the given network.
We can see from Table 5, that in order to get the same effect on the
attacker, the AI search can provide a solution with much less deceptive
computers and much less fake vulnerabilities.
We can see that the number of computers chosen as deceptive in the ran-
dom approach is constantly very high in comparison to the number of
computers needed to be deceptive in the AI search approach.
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Furthermore, as expected when the number of hosts in the network in-
crease, ”guessing” the right deceptive computers is much harder.
The number of computers chosen as deceptive is at least 1.6 times higher
in the random approach, and as the network grows it gets up to 7.3 times
more.
The number of fake vulnerabilities assignments is at least 14 times higher
in the random approach, and as the network grows it gets up to 73 times
more.
Table 5: AI search approach VS. Random approach
Approach Network Relative in-
crease of the
attacker’s cost
Number of
deceptive
IPs
Number of
fake vulnera-
bilities added
Attackers to-
tal planning
time (S)
AI search NET10 1.8 3 3 0.22
Random NET10 1.8 5 42 0.196
AI search NET10 2.3 5 5 0.3
Random NET10 2.3 9 103 0.26
AI search NET20 1.7 2 2 2.58
Random NET20 1.7 7 60 2.527
AI search NET20 2.1 3 3 4.22
Random NET20 2.1 10 94 2.86
AI search NET50 1.6 2 2 55.8
Random NET50 1.6 14 148 43.544
AI search NET50 2.1 4 4 164.5
Random NET50 2.1 22 238 156.33
AI search NET80 1.7 2 2 37.58
Random NET80 1.7 12 122 34.492
AI search NET80 2.1 3 3 110.7
Random NET80 2.1 22 219 100.58
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5. Related work
The approach presented in this research utilizes a defense strategy that pro-
vides false information to attackers. The falsified information is optimized based
on the attack graph representation of the protected network. Next we discuss
the major topics related to this strategy including: deception, attack graph
games, obfuscation, and others.
5.1. Attack Graph Analysis
Simulating an attacker can be done by multiple ways: using a heuristic
search, planner, greedy algorithm and more. Planning an attack can be on-
line or offline. When the environment is known, planning can be done offline,
meaning that solutions can be found and evaluated prior to execution. But,
in the real world the attacker can’t always know the target’s network topology,
configurations and more information. Thus, an online approach is more suitable
for attack situations.
Nirnay Ghosh et al. [29] proposed a methodology for generating an optimal
attack path in wireless networks, which allows the network administrator to
detect the most risk-prone attack path, i.e., the path that is most likely to be
chosen by the attacker in order to gain a critical resource in the network. By
achieving that, the security administrator can prioritize the security mechanism.
In this article, they used PSO (particle swarm optimization) in order to find the
optimal attack path using attack vector metrics. Each wireless node considers
as a PSO particle and the motion of each particle replicate the mobility of the
wireless nodes. Like the particles in PSO, the attacker’s aim is always directed
towards the target. Unlike the classic PSO, every node in the wireless have
been assigned with weight that represent a severity measures obtained from
customized risk parameters, also, the position of the node is immaterial. An
artificial case study was presented, which modeled network with 100 hosts. After
a pair of source and destination is given, the execution time grows exponentially
as the number of visited nodes (=n) increases. Which means the time complexity
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is O(cn). It is important to mention that this is the first time such technique
where the warm optimization concept is used to generate an attack path.
Another work of Nirnay Ghosh et al. is netsecuritas which [30] presents a
heuristic-based attack graph generation algorithm which takes into considera-
tion both attack graph properties and predefined security budget of any organi-
zation. The attack graph type represented is an exploit dependency graph an
acyclic directed graph which constructed from two types of nodes - exploit and
security condition and two types of edges one represents a relation of require
(condition to exploit) and the second is an imply relation (from exploit to con-
dition node). It takes a list of exploits and a list of hosts as input, and generates
attack graph in the form of an adjacency list. They use a backward chaining
approach in order to find paths that terminate at the initial conditions. The al-
gorithm starts from the goal state and then finds a list of exploits that can yield
the desired condition. From this list of exploits, the algorithm makes a decision
to choose the easiest one. The easiest one is choose based on the assumption
that when multiple vulnerabilities exist in a host, the attackers choose the one
easiest to exploit. The other exploits pushed into a stack. Now the algorithm
finds a list of hosts through which that exploit can be executed, from this list
it chooses the easiest to exploit and the others push into the stack. The easiest
host is selected under the assumption that the host with the higher number of
vulnerabilities is more likely to be detected and used by the attacker to execute
the exploit. When the exploration is completed, successfully (reaches the initial
condition) or in the dead end, the algorithm backtracks and evaluates other
hosts or exploits from the stack. The presented algorithm is working at O(n∗e)
when n is the number of hosts and e is the total number of exploits.
Penetration testing is a common methodology for identifying security risks,
by running friendly attacks[25]. Simulated penetration testing automates this
process, by designing a model of the system in question, and using model-based
attack planning to generate the attacks. Basic methods from this domain were
discussed in previous parts of this literature survey, and include, among oth-
ers, the automatic generation of attack graphs by MulVAL, or model checking
50
methods. Those models require complete knowledge of the network, hosts con-
figuration, connectivity, and more for them to work. This level of knowledge
of the system attacked is rarely available in the process of hacking a system.
Ideally, a simulated penetration testing would conduct its attacks in a way sim-
ilar to that of a real attacker, including the information gathering phase, and
reasoning. Hence the goal of simulated penetration testing is much more am-
bitious: to realistically simulate a human hacker. In a more functional view,
the simulated penetration testing model space spans a broad range of sequential
decision making problems. In his work, Jorg Hoffmann [24] has analyzed prior
work in AI and other relevant areas, and conducted a systematization of this
model space, highlighting a multitude of interesting challenges to AI sequential
decision making research.
Jorg [24] Identified two major dimensions characterizing this space:
(A) How to handle the uncertainty from the point of view of the attacker.
(B) The degree of interaction between individual attack components
To illustrate the point of (A), we need to remember that in many cases, exploits
can fail, depending on the specific configuration needed for the exploit to run
successfully, or protection measures taken by the target. To illustrate the point
of (B) we should consider the implications of an attacker’s action on the envi-
ronment, such as crashing a machine after a failed exploitation attempt, or the
ability to change network configuration. In the realm of uncertainty, there are
3 main models:
1. No uncertainty - each action succeeds
2. MDP - Markov Decision Process
3. POMDP - Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
MDP in the context of attack graphs is a model in which each action has a
number of possible outcomes, depending on a probability assigned to this ac-
tion. Many models take the simplifying assumption that there are only two
possible outcomes to each action (exploitation) which are success / failure. Of
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course in practice, this is not always the case. POMDP could be seen as an
abstraction of MDP, in the sense that in POMDP, along with the basic actions
of an MDP, there are sensing actions, which can alter the probability of the
basic actions.
Until this day, modeling attack graphs in MDP or POMDP has been mainly the-
oretical and suffered from severe scalability issues. Very similar to the problem
the academic world has encountered trying to solve attack graphs using model
checkers. Relevant research done in this area could be seen in Jorg’s previ-
ous research [24] about POMDP in penetration testing, and Durkota’s research
[31] work about modeling attack graph as MDP. Although both approaches
shown above seem very interesting, they still suffer from scalability problems,
and require a significant amount of simplifying assumptions that are not always
possible. One of the reoccurring simplifying assumption is the knowledge of the
network connectivity [32]. The actions an attacker would take to discover the
network could be used in various scenarios to detect an attacker in the network.
Durkota et al. [31] describes a method for representing an attack graph as an
MDP. In this representation, each state in the MDP is a set of performed actions
(exploits) and labels whether the action was successful or not. Each action is
assigned a cost and a probability. Then, an optimized MDP solver is being used
to narrow down the search space of the optimal policy. Some of the optimization
techniques described are branch and bounds, which is used to prune unfavorable
branches of the tree. Another optimization technique Durkota is offering is
sibling-class theorem, which is used to identify multiple actions which results in
the same effect. In these cases, only the lowest cost action is investigated further.
Compared to basic MDP solvers, Durkota’s algorithm performed faster, and
used less memory. Although, even with the optimization, the algorithm often
ran out of memory, and it is assumed it will not scale well to large enterprise
networks.
Malte Helmert [26] published the Fast Downward planner, which is a classical
planning system based on heuristic search. It can deal with general deterministic
planning problems encoded in the propositional fragment of PDDL2.2, includ-
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ing advanced features like ADL conditions and effects and derived predicates
(axioms). Like other well-known planners such as HSP and FF, Fast Downward
is a progression planner, searching the space of world states of a planning task in
the forward direction. This planner can be used in the cyber field by converting
any attack problem to pddl problem and solve it using this planner.
We used this tool combined with the Jork Huffman POMDP converter [24] and
some guidelines from Durkota et al work [31] in order to achieve ”a worthy
opponent” to our method.
5.2. Deception
In cyber security, deception is often used to create a controlled path for at-
tackers to follow starting from the the initial reconnaissance phase. For example,
Cohen and Koike [33, 34] showed how deception can control the path of an at-
tack using red teams in experiments attacking a computer network. Repik [35]
makes a strong argument in favor of planned actions taken to mislead hackers.
If the deception is obvious to the adversary, even unintentionally, the attacker
can avoid, bypass, and even overcome the deceptive traps. We aim to avoid this
situation and make the deception hard to identify by an adversary. [[RP:Move
to intro]]
The recognition that deception could be an integral part of the network
defense field, resulted in the need for a tool for deception, and Fred Cohen
designed the Deception ToolKit (DTK) [19], a tool which makes it appear to
attackers as though the system running the DTK has a large number of widely
known vulnerabilities. When the attacker issues a command or request, the
DTK generates a predefined response, in order to encourage the attacker to
continue its exploration of the host, or results in a shutdown of the service.
5.2.1. Honeypots
Honeypots were first used in computer security in the late 1990s. Honeypots
tempt the attackers to believe that they are valuable assets. However, being
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thoroughly monitored and usually isolated, honeypots give the defender the
ability to detect and deflect the attack attempts [36]:
Detection – Honeypots result in a low false positive rate, because they are
not intended to be used as part of the user’s routine tasks in a system; thus any
interaction with the honeypots is illegitimate.
Prevention – Honeypots slow down attackers or discourage them from car-
rying on the attacks. For example, the LaBrea’s ”sticky” honeypots [37] which
answer connection attempts in a way that causes the machine on the other end
to get ”stuck”, sometimes for a very long time.
Intelligence – Honeypots are also used for gathering information about at-
tacks. The Honeynet Project [38] is an international security research organi-
zation, which invests its resources in the investigation of the latest attacks and
the development of open source security tools to improve Internet security.
Naturally adversaries try to avoid honeypots.Rowe et al. [4] suggest the idea
of fake honeypots, in which a system might pretend to be a honeypot in order
to scare away attackers, reducing the number of attacks and their severity.
Fake vulnerabilities employed in current work for attack graph obfuscation
transform a regular operational machine into a kind of high-interaction honey-
pot. However, there are several significant differences between fake vulnerabil-
ties and honeypots. First, fake vulnerabilities must not allow exploitation of
the vulnerability because they are installed on real operational systems. In con-
trast, exploitation is desirable in case of honeypots. Second, [[RP:TBD]] Our
approach does not alter the system while honeypotbased solutions introduce vul-
nerable machines in order to either capture the attacker or collect information
for forensic purposes. Instead, we aim at deceiving attackers by manipulat-
ing their view of the target system and forcing them to plan attacks based on
inaccurate knowledge, so that the attacks will likely fail.
5.2.2. Virtual Attack Surface
In [20], the authors propose algorithmic solutions to two classes of problems:
1. Inducing an external view that is at a minimum distance from the internal
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view, while minimizing the cost for the defender.
2. Inducing an external view that maximizes the distance from the internal
view, given an upper bound on the cost for the defender.
In their solution they build a manipulation graph - a graph that gathered
[[RP:reflects?]] all the possible manipulations to the current system. Then
they present two heuristics in order to solve the problems described above:
1. TopKDistance - which recursively traverses the subgraph to find a solution.
2. TopKBudget - answer the same problems as TopKDistance but improve
time efficiency in the resolution.
Furthermore, they present deception-based techniques for defeating an attackers
effort to fingerprint operating systems and services on the target system. They
do it by modifying the outgoing traffic.
In contrast to considering only the impact of the manipulations on the de-
fender, we consider both, the impact on the defender and on the attacker. For-
mulating the problem as an attack graph, enables to model the effect on the
attacker’s efforts for all possible paths to reach its goal in the network. In addi-
tion, the impact of the fake vulnerabilities on the defender network is modeled
as well.
In our work, the main role of deception is to make the attacker believe that
the information obtained is real. When this is successfully accomplished, the
defender can gain a significant advantage over the adversary.
5.3. Attack Graph games
Recently there has been significant interest in applying game theory ap-
proaches to security. Durkota et al. introduced the term, ”attack graph game”
[39], and presented a new leader-follower game-theory model of the interaction
between a network administrator and an attacker who follows a multistage plan
to attack the network. In order to determine the best strategy for the defender,
they used the Stackelberg game (a two phase game), in which the defender,
(the leader of the game), takes actions in order to strengthen the network by
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adding honeypots. Then, the attacker selects an optimal attack plan based on
knowledge about the defender’s strategy. The Stackelberg equilibrium is found
by selecting the pure action of the defender that minimizes the expected loss
under the assumption that the attacker will respond with an optimal attack.
The researchers presented the problem by using a type of logical attack graph
that they refer to as dependency attack graphs which are generated by Mul-
VAL. They model the problem as an MDP problem and assign random costs
and rewards for solving it.
In contrast to our research, there is a choice of how much decoys to put in
the network in order to minimize the expected loss of the defender by increasing
the probability that the attacker will be caught. Our main goal is to make it
more difficult for the attacker, causing attrition and a waste of the adversary’s
valuable resources until the adversary is detected or waste its resources.
The results of this paper were based on an experiment conducted on a small
business network (20 hosts) with 14 honeypots. They reported on performance
of less than 10 seconds, but did not demonstrate it or analyzed the scalability
for a larger network. Our method was tested on a real enterprise network and
can scale for large networks as well.
5.4. Active Defense
Cohen and Koike presented a set of experiments where they successfully
induced skilled red-team attackers to attack the targeted system in a particular
sequence [33]. Their main goal was to mimic physical attack tactics where such
techniques can be used to lure the adversaries into specific zones by influencing
their decisions, that means taking a specific path desired by the defenders.
Another approach was presented by Trassare [40]. He presented a technique
to deceive attackers by giving them a fake internal network topology of the
defender’s choice. His strategy is to place the deceptive functionality on the
border routers of an AS, because any designated device within the AS or the
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whole network is protected by the deception. Lastly, he presents a prototype
implementation showing positive results.
Two Israeli startups: Cymmetria [41] and TRAPX security [42] proposed
practical ideas for integrating deception in the industry.
TRAPX developed the DeceptionGrid Platform, each activity from the light-
est reconnaissance to advanced breach attempts is contained, recorded and
alerted enabling immediate remediation. It deploys automatic an array of decoys
(Traps) and breadcrumbs (tokens) that provides visibility into ongoing attacks
while luring attackers away from valuable assets.
Cymmetria developed the MazeRunner, which creates breadcrumbs and de-
coys in order to lead attackers to believe that they have successfully gained
access to a target machine. Having gained a false sense of security, attackers re-
veal their attack tools and methods, which defenders are then able to document
and analyze.
The above tools are using dedicated decoys, which are virtual machines
(servers or other devices). These decoys are used to identify an interaction with
the adversary based on the intuition that legitimate users are not expected to
interact with these decoys. These decoys are reached by following breadcrumbs,
found on an endpoint. Breadcrumbs are passive elements of data that can be
found by the attacker in the reconnaissance phase (e.g. browser cookies, RDP
and SSH credentials, shared folder mappings, OpenVPN scripts).
Our approach is different because we are not focusing on luring the attacker
into specific points in the network, but focusing on causing the adversary sig-
nificant loss of resources and significant increase in the attack execution time.
5.5. Obfuscation
In order to perform a successful attack, one key piece of information that
attackers need is the identity of the target system’s running services and oper-
ating system. Operating systems have unique characteristics that can help an
attacker to identify the operating system being used in the target system. Ex-
amples of these characteristics include the TCP/IP packet, response messages
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to queries, response messages to errors, predictability of sequence numbers, and
banner information.
Murphy et al. [1] investigated the efficacy of using a host-based operating sys-
tem (OS) obfuscation as an integral part of Air Force computer defenses. They
used the OSfuscate tool, by Crenshaw [43], and concluded that it is effective in
continuously obfuscating the host OS. OS obfuscation is a hard task! Making
enough changes to normal OS functions that trick an attacker while maintaining
a stable system that functions, is not a simple task.
If the defenders use deception techniques, attackers can’t make
worry-free actions in the network. Instead, they are now forced to
invest more resources, time, and effort in their attack attempts, and
are under constant fear to perform a wrong move and get caught. It
is clear that deception creates a hostile environment for attackers.
Unlike many studies in this field, our approach is not focusing on luring
the attacker through specific paths. Our approach will focus on wasting the
attacker’s time and resources.
5.6. Moving Target Defense
A cyber moving target technique, is the presentation of a dynamic attack
surface, increasing an adversary’s work factor necessary to probe, attack, or
maintain presence in a cyber target [44]. Moving target defense (MTD) has
been shown to be effective in cyber defense [45] and may become a game changer
in the cyber security arena. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss some
key examples from the MTD research field that is related to our research:
Proactive Obfuscation :
In [46] the authors create server replicas that are likely to have fewer shared
vulnerabilities. They do this by applying semantic-preserving code transfor-
mations which result diverse set of executables. In each period, they restart
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the servers with fresh images, these replicas will react differently to identical
attacks. Thus, there are less opportunities for the attacker to compromise too
many of the replicas that a service consists of. For example, the success of a
buffer overflow attack typically will depend on stack layout details, so repli-
cas using different obfuscated executables based on address reordering or stack
padding are likely to crash instead of cave in to the attacker control.
Dynamic Network Address Translation :
In 1999, as part of the DARPA Information Assurance Program, a dynamic ap-
proach for active network defense was presented. This approach tried to verify
the assumption that ”Dynamic modification of defensive structures improves
system assurance” [47]. The goal of this research was to prevent the attacker’s
ability to scan and map the network, which will make the attack more challeng-
ing. What they did is to change dynamically the addresses and port numbers
used by the network’s computers. The tool they used called Dynamic Net-
work Translation (DYNAT), which camouflage the host identity information
in TCP/IP packets. In their experiments they showed that their approach
made it almost impossible to map the network while significantly increasing
the attacker’s effort. Beating DYNAT is difficult because in order to attack
directly the target, the attacker needs to know the address hopping mechanism.
However, there are number of drawbacks when using DYNAT: It requires that
trusted computers computers on both sides of the communication be within the
protection of DYNAT processes.
Mutable Network :
A Mutable Network (MUTE) [48] is a method that composed changing network
configurations such as: IP addresses, port numbers and routes between two
points on the network. This method creates kind of virtual overlay above the ex-
isting network, which all the traffic is routed in this virtual overlay. That means,
that the original IP address and information on the systems never changes. This
method uses encrypted channels in order to synchronize the IP address infor-
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mation.
N-Variant Systems :
The N-Variant systems framework [49] executes a set of automatically diversified
variants on the same inputs, and monitors their behavior to detect divergences.
This platform based on the fact that an attacker requires to simultaneously
compromise all system variants with the same input. The proof-of-concept was
built into the Linux kernel.
Changing computer configurations using genetic algorithms :
Crouse & Fulp [50] try to find more secure configurations of systems by using
genetic algorithms. They use three ideas from genetics:
◦ Selection - selecting the best configurations based on their security score.
◦ Crossover - taking two configurations and combining elements of each one
to create a new configuration.
◦ Mutation - randomly changing parts of a configuration to make it different
from configurations on other systems.
The goal of this method is to create diverse configurations, temporally and
spatially. Temporal diversity refers to the difference of configuration in a single
computer over time and Spatial diversity refers to the difference of configuration
between computers at any point in time.
The solution presented in the MTD field tends to reconfigure a system in
order to modify the network, according to the adversary’s perception. On the
other hand, the view of the system is usually inferred by attackers based on
the results of probing and scanning tools. Starting from this observation, we
do not modify the network but rather provide fake responses to probing. thus,
the produced attack graph will be significantly different from the actual attack
graph constructed from the network, without altering the system itself.
After a thorough review of studies that are directly related to our approach,
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we can say that to the best of our knowledge, there is no approach that adds false
vulnerabilities and considers that the act of adding these ”lies” has consequences
to the routine operation of the network. Therefore, we were unable to find a
method that carefully selects which fake vulnerabilities to add and indicates
where to add them, optimally, in the network’s PCs (without adding dedicated
decoys), with the aims of making it harder for the attacker, forcing the attacker
to use a significant amount of resources, and increasing the attack execution time
dramatically.
6. Conclusion and future work
6.1. Discussion
In this thesis, we gathered several guidelines for fake vulnerabilities assign-
ments, which prevent detection of the applied deception by the adversary and
also suggest how to assign fake vulnerabilities in an optimal manner.
When applying a deception mechanism it is important to mask the deception.
If the deception mechanism is consistent and free from contradictions, it will be
difficult to identify by the adversary and therefore its effect will be greater.
We present new way to defend networks by assigning fake vulnerabilities in an
optimal way.
First, we model all the possible paths of an attack in the network using a state
of the art model, called logical attack graph. Then, we find the optimal assign-
ment of fake vulnerabilities in the given network, using the attack graph model.
As initial results, we proposed a random assignment of fake vulnerabilities. In
order to find an optimal assignment, that maximize the adversary’s effort, we
model this problem as an AI search problem. Where each node represents the
fake assignments chosen so far, and the fake assignments left to choose.
We have proposed an admissible heuristic and a non-admissible heuristic, in
order to examine the impact on the running time. We can see from the results
that there was no significant difference in running time between the admissible
heuristic and the non-admissible heuristic. Thus, in this case, an optimal as-
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signment of fake vulnerabilities is preferable.
In order to reduce the algorithm’s run time, besides examine an admissible and
non-admissible heuristics, we offered a two more improvements:
• Different search algorithms - We examine both A* and DFBnB search
algorithms. From the results, we can see that in all tested cases, A* finds
the optimal assignment of fake vulnerabilities and confirm it faster than
the DFBnB search algorithm.
• Sorting the list of assignment candidates - We examine two different list
sorting - shortest path first and high utility first. Although there was no
significant difference in run time between the two, but they were signifi-
cantly better than a random sorting. Thus, the two suggested list ordering
approaches improve the run time of the algorithm.
From the results described in the previous section, we can conclude that
solving the problem of fake vulnerabilities assignment is applicable for enter-
prise networks, when using the appropriate parameters for search:
We can see that A* search algorithm can find and assert the optimal solution
quickly, by using good ordering of the candidates list. For example, finding an
optimal solution using A* search algorithm with shortest path first (or high
utility first) candidate list sorting, can decreased up to 43 times less the run
time factor, compared to find an optimal solution using DFBnB search algo-
rithm with random ordering of the candidate list.
We found a good admissible heuristic, which does not dramatically increase
running time, relative to the non-admissible one, and produce optimal results.
As described in this thesis, the input to this algorithm, besides the given en-
terprise network, is the budget. In a real functioning network, attackers may
prefer to attack the network during the night, when the amount of communica-
tion passing through the network is lower. Furthermore, a defender may want,
in order to not overload the network in a day time, to increase the amount of
deception in the network. All of the above reinforces the choice of adjusting the
amount of budget as input in the system.
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Not less important, we confirm that our method is applicable in an enterprise
network and adding fake vulnerabilities is feasible. We examine our approach
on a real enterprise network with 80 hosts on a virtual machine with average
capabilities at a reasonable time.
6.2. Future work
Our goal is to produce optimal deployment of fake vulnerabilities to an
enterprise network. The study can be continued in several directions: First, we
can and should shorten the running time. We can do it by reducing the size of
the attack graph. We can use [51], [52], [53] or [54] works in order to reduce the
given attack graph, and apply our AI search approach on it.
This will help us reduce the run time in two critical phases in our algorithm:
1. Minimize the number of potential deceptive computers.
2. We can reduce the time of finding the optimal path to the goal, at each
fake vulnerabilities assignment, during the search algorithm. From the
results we can see that this phase can repeat more than 10,000 times (see
Figure 18).
Another direction we can take, is to collect a real attacks data sets and model
the attacker by using this knowledge. Our method can also fit after modifying
the attacker’s modeling.
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